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 I.  Introduction 
 This chapter analyzes the origins, evolution, and impact of the TLO on access to 
medicines (A2M). This TLO is currently characterized by a low level of norma-
tive settlement and institutional alignment (the “low institutionalization” cell of 
 Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ). Disputes over the regulation of A2M 
are occurring in multiple transnational, national, and local venues, including the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the World Health Organization 
(WHO), bilateral treaty negotiations, national parliaments, constitutional courts, and 
 domestic administrative agencies. Competing groups of states and non-state actors 
shift horizontally and vertically among these forums in an effort to develop compet-
ing legal rules over the propriety of granting intellectual property (IP)  protection to 
newly developed life-saving drugs. 
 On one side of this contested terrain are multinational pharmaceutical compa-
nies and the industrialized countries in which they are based, which argue that 
strong patent protection is essential to incentivizing medical research and develop-
ment. On the other side are public interest NGOs and developing country negotia-
tors (including those from Brazil, India, South Africa, and several nations in Latin 
America), which invoke the human right to health to justify restricting pharmaceuti-
cal patents, facilitating the manufacture of cheaper generic copies, and maximizing 
the distribution of life-saving medicines to millions of the world’s poor. Squeezed in 
the middle are many national governments, which confront a shrinking domestic 
policy space hemmed in by a thicket of overlapping treaty commitments, diminish-
ing health budgets, and national court judgments ordering the provision of essential 
medicines to the patients who demand them. 
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 This chapter applies the TLOs framework (Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ) to 
explain the origins of these controversies and their consequences. The chapter 
argues that the current state of affairs arose from a clash between two previously 
discrete TLOs – one relating to IP protection (specifi cally, patent protection for new 
drugs) and the other concerning the right to health (in particular, a right of access 
to essential medicines, including patented medicines). The collision between these 
unrelated TLOs occurred diachronically in three distinct phases. 
 In Phase 1, which occurred prior to the mid-1990s, the IP and right to health 
TLOs each existed in relatively stable but distinct policy spaces. Within each TLO, 
legal norms were highly aligned but unsettled, placing each TLO in the upper left 
quadrant of  Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ).  Section II of this chapter 
identifi es the facilitating circumstances and precipitating conditions that led to the 
formation of each TLO, the degree of alignment among the relevant international 
institutions, and the interactions among key actors over the development of legal 
norms. It also describes the wide discretion that national and subnational actors 
enjoyed regarding how to regulate A2M. 
 Phase 2, which occurred roughly between the mid-1990s and 2000, involved a 
rapid expansion of the IP TLO, in particular, of the legal and geographic scope of 
pharmaceutical patents . This expansion resulted from the incorporation of IP into 
the WTO as embodied in the  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) and the subsequent negotiation of regional and bilateral trea-
ties that require “TRIPS Plus” IP standards.  Section III of this chapter describes 
the formation, institutionalization, and domestic effects of these developments. It 
argues that the regulation of A2M during this period was characterized by a high 
degree of normative settlement and low levels of alignment (the lower right quad-
rant of  Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ), a confi guration that refl ected 
the ability of industrialized nations that favored strong patent protection for new 
drugs to impose their policy preferences on developing countries. 
 Section IV of the chapter analyzes Phase 3 – a period from approximately 2000 
to the present – the most salient features of which were a backlash against pharma-
ceutical patents and a campaign by developing countries and civil society groups 
to increase A2M. The facilitating conditions for these events were an increase in 
the legalization and justiciability of the human right to health in international and 
national law. High-profi le litigation by proponents of strong patents provided the 
precipitating events for this backlash. Specifi cally, the United States and pharma-
ceutical fi rms attempted aggressively to enforce pharmaceutical patents in Brazil 
and South Africa , ignoring the implications of both countries’ efforts to combat 
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. These enforcement efforts triggered a coordinated 
public relations and international advocacy response by key NGOs and developing 
country governments. 
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 The result, at the international level, was a modest weakening of patent  protection 
in the form of a WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and 
an amendment of TRIPS. Galvanized by these developments, both proponents 
and opponents of IP shifted their advocacy strategies to different venues . Industrialized 
countries focused on bilateral and plurilateral treaty negotiations (including the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership 
(TPP)), and NGOs and patients invoked the right to health in national court litiga-
tion , especially in developing countries , to compel governments to broaden access 
to patented drugs . As a result of these competing efforts, contestations over A2M 
now occur simultaneously and sequentially in multilateral, regional, bilateral, and 
domestic forums, creating a TLO that is both weakly aligned and unsettled (the 
lower left cell of  Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ). For many govern-
ments, the unfortunate consequence is a marked diminution in the domestic policy 
space available to regulate A2M.  Section V concludes by summarizing the chapter’s 
contributions to the study of TLOs. 
 II.  Phase 1: Distinct TLOs for Intellectual Property 
and Human Rights 
 This section analyzes the two distinct TLOs – one for IP and the other for the right 
to health – that governed A2M prior to the mid-1990s. After describing the facilitat-
ing circumstances and precipitating conditions that led to the formation of each 
TLO, it analyzes the degree of institutional alignment and normative settlement in 
each issue area, focusing on the legal and geographic scope of the relevant norms 
and the contestations among key actors at the transnational, national, and local 
levels.  Section II concludes with an assessment of the combined impact of the two 
TLOs on the domestic regulatory space relating to A2M . 
 A.  The Intellectual Property TLO Prior to the Mid-1990s 
 This section reviews the origins and evolution of the IP TLO, with a focus on pat-
ents and pharmaceuticals. It summarizes decades of legal and policy developments 
that commentators have analyzed in detail elsewhere (Sell  1998 ; Correa  2000 ; Watal 
2001; Sell  2003 ; Helfer  2004 ). 
 1.  Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions 
 Patents are exclusive economic rights awarded to inventors for limited time peri-
ods that prevent others from making, using, importing, or selling the patented 
inventions. In return for granting these rights, patent applicants must disclose the 
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invention in a manner that enables others to put it into practice. Other prerequisites 
for patentability are novelty (a new characteristic not found in the “prior art”), non-
obviousness (an “inventive step” not obvious to one skilled in the fi eld), and utility 
or industrial applicability (Ho  2011 ). 
 Patents enable inventors to recoup the costs of their research and development 
and to earn a profi t by charging consumers monopoly prices. From the public’s 
 vantage point, the patent system assumes that the short-term costs of higher prices 
are offset by the additional inventions that protection encourages over the long term. 
Stated in economic terms, the core justifi cation for a patent system is the belief that 
patents improve dynamic effi ciency (by stimulating innovation and technological 
progress) at the expense of static effi ciency (resulting from the costs of monopoly 
pricing) (UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights  2002 ). 
 National patent laws are exclusively territorial in scope. As a result, inventors lob-
bied for an international legal regime to protect their innovations in other jurisdic-
tions.  The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, adopted in 
1883 and revised periodically over the following century, harmonizes procedures 
relating to priority, registration, and licensing, and it requires national treatment for 
foreign patent owners. The treaty’s substantive standards of protection, however, are 
extremely modest (Sell  2003 : 108–109; Hestermeyer  2007 : 35–37). 
 England and the  United States fi rst recognized patents for new medicines in 
the late 1700s. The laws of both countries distinguish between “product” and 
“ process” patents for new drugs. A product patent grants the owner exclusive rights 
over the chemical compound itself; a process patent covers only the means by 
which that compound is made and allows others to produce the same drug using a 
different method. Many other countries, however, expressly excluded pharmaceu-
ticals from one or both types of patent protection. For example, most developing 
nations and many industrialized countries did not recognize product patents for 
new drugs until well into the second half of the twentieth century. This omission 
was not inadvertent but rather refl ected a conscious choice to promote the pro-
duction, importation, and distribution of cheaper generic medicines. In refl ection 
of this reality, the Paris Convention did not require signatory nations to recognize 
either product or process patents for medicines (Correa  2007 : 271; Hestermeyer 
 2007 : 28, 37). 
 Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry strongly opposed the lack of full 
patent protection for new drugs. It framed its objection in economic and moral 
terms. The unfettered copying of patented medicines was, the industry complained, 
a competitive disadvantage for industrialized economies and a deplorable form of 
modern-day “piracy.” These arguments resonated with industrialized country gov-
ernments, which recognized the strategic importance of intangible knowledge goods 
for economic growth and international trade (Sell  1998 ; Deere  2009 ). 
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 2.  Institutionalization: Venues, Actors, and Norms 
 In the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry launched a campaign for stronger IP rights. 
The campaign unfolded in two primary venues. At the national level, the industry 
lobbied the United States (and, to a lesser extent, the European Community) to 
threaten sanctions against countries that failed to protect those rights. Internationally, 
it opposed an effort by developing nations to roll back patent provisions of the Paris 
Convention. 
 The “Special 301” procedure adopted by the United States is perhaps the most 
 well-known example of the national strategy. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
authorized the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate countries with weak IP pro-
tection and threaten retaliatory trade sanctions against them. The United States 
deployed Special 301 against more than a dozen countries between the 1970s 
and early 1990s, successfully pressuring governments to enact IP reforms that 
benefi tted foreign IP industries, including U.S.-based pharmaceutical companies 
(Katzenberger & Kur  1996 ; Puckett & Reynolds  1996 ). 
 In the framework provided by Halliday and Shaffer, Special 301 increased the 
geographic scope and normative unsettlement of the legal rules governing patent 
medicines at the national and local levels. As a result of U.S. pressure, laws on the 
books in targeted developing countries more closely refl ected U.S. policy prefer-
ences. But law in action – specifi cally, the application of those laws by domestic 
patent examiners – was a different matter. Empirical studies of this period revealed 
continued lack of patent enforcement in many developing nations (Buscaglia & 
Guerrero-Cusumano  1995 ). In addition, the economic coercion that the United 
States deployed resulted in the adoption of legal norms that developing states either 
openly resisted or accepted only grudgingly. 
 Internationally, normative contestations played out in the early 1980s at a frac-
tious diplomatic conference convened to consider revisions to the Paris Convention. 
WIPO was the most logical international organization to host these negotiations. 
The specialized UN agency was established in the late 1960s to “promot[e]  creative 
intellectual activity and facilitat[e] the transfer of technology . . . to developing 
countries in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development” 
(UN-WIPO Agreement 1967, Article 1) and to “promote the protection of intel-
lectual property throughout the world” (WIPO Convention 1967, Article 3(i)). 
WIPO’s Secretariat achieved these arguably disparate goals by administering IP 
treaties, providing technical assistance and policy advice to domestic IP adminis-
trative agencies, and hosting multilateral conferences for member states. No other 
international organization rivaled WIPO in the performance of these tasks, with 
the result that the IP TLO of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by a high 
degree of issue area alignment. 
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 The opening salvo in the WIPO patent wars occurred in 1980, when India and the 
Andean Pact countries introduced a proposal to give preferential treatment for the 
Paris Convention’s developing country members, a revision that would have diluted 
the treaty’s patent rules, including those relating to pharmaceuticals. The United 
States and other industrialized nations strongly opposed any efforts to weaken the 
treaty, and they introduced their own counterproposals to expand patent rights. 
The competing groups fought pitched diplomatic battles on and off for several 
years. When the dust settled in 1985, the United States and its allies had fought the 
 developing countries to a standstill. The conference ended in a deadlock, without 
any revision of the Paris Convention (Sell  1998 : 107–130). 
 The failed negotiations led the United States and the European Community to 
conclude that they could not satisfy the IP industries’ demands for stronger patent 
protection in WIPO by revising the IP treaties within that organization’s purview. 
Dissatisfaction with WIPO was a catalyst for radically restructuring the institutional 
alignment of the IP TLO, an issue that is analyzed in  Section III . 
 B.  The Human Rights TLO Prior to the Mid-1990s 
 This section provides a thumbnail sketch of the evolution of the international human 
rights regime, emphasizing developments relevant to the right to health analyzed at 
greater length elsewhere (Henkin et al.  2009 ; Helfer & Austin  2011 ). 
 1.  Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions 
 World War II provided the impetus for creating an international legal regime to 
protect the fundamental rights of all human beings. Confronted with irrefutable 
evidence of mass atrocities, the victors of that confl ict resolved to change interna-
tional law’s presumption that abuses committed by a nation-state against its  citizens 
within its borders was the concern of that state alone. During the ensuing decades, 
the human rights TLO developed in two principle ways – the articulation and 
refi nement of a catalog of individual liberties and the creation of new international 
institutions. 
 States achieved the fi rst objective by adopting numerous non-binding declarations 
and treaties to protect a wide array of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Many of the rights in these international instruments were later incorporated 
into national constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions, providing a layer of 
domestic legal protection and remedies for violations. Human rights advocates were 
keenly aware, however, that governments are often unwilling or unable to police 
their own conduct. They thus supported the creation of international tribunals and 
review bodies to monitor whether governments were in fact respecting these rights. 
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 Not surprisingly, many states were reluctant to submit themselves to external 
 scrutiny and resisted proposals to create a global human rights court or centralized 
monitoring mechanism. Instead, the international institutions in the human rights 
TLO evolved in a piecemeal fashion, resulting in a dizzying array of courts, tribu-
nals, commissions, committees, working groups, and Special Rapporteurs. Within 
the UN human rights system alone, the number of international review and mon-
itoring mechanisms is staggering. It includes the Human Rights Council (which, 
prior to 2006, was known as the Commission on Human Rights); the Council’s 
Advisory Committee (until 2006, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights); the High Commissioner for Human Rights; scores 
of Special Rapporteurs and working groups; and more than a dozen treaty bodies 
(Henkin et al.  2009 ). 
 These trends – normative expansion and institutional fragmentation – also char-
acterized the evolution of the right to health. International recognition of this right 
dates back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , Article 25 of which states 
that everyone has “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including . . . medical care.” The Preamble of the 
WHO Constitution similarly proclaims that “[t]he enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being.” 
 The right to health has been reaffi rmed in numerous global and regional human 
rights instruments (Marks  2006 ) and has been incorporated into two-thirds of 
national constitutions (Kinney & Clark  2004 ). The most prominent treaty is the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
which “recognize[s] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health,” including “those necessary for . . . 
[t]he  prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases” (ICESCR, Article 12). Adopted in 1966, the ICESCR entered into 
force ten years later. As of 1995, more than 130 countries had ratifi ed the treaty . 
 2.  Institutionalization: Venues, Actors, and Norms 
 Notwithstanding the widespread international acceptance of the right to health in 
principle, state and non-state actors continued to debate the content of the right 
at the national and local levels. ICESCR was drafted to attract ratifi cations from 
socialist states, developing nations, and industrialized countries. Such widespread 
appeal could only be achieved, however, by adopting vague norms that papered over 
deep-seated ideological divisions among these groups of countries (Henkin et al. 
 2009 : 219). 
 Further underscoring these differences was the programmatic and promotional 
nature of the  right to health. As the ICESCR states in a famously ambiguous 
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passage, each state party is required to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of” economic, social, and cultural rights (ICESCR, Article 2.1). For many 
 commentators, the incremental, resource-dependent nature of progressive real-
ization robbed the right to health of any meaningful substantive content, pro-
vided insuffi cient guidance to states, and cast doubt on the justiciability of health 
rights by national courts (Fidler  1999 : 188; Toebes  1999 : 661–662; Meier & Mori 
 2005 : 114). In the human rights TLO’s early years, these normative challenges 
went mostly unanswered. 
 Beginning in the late 1980s, however, one international body responded to 
these criticisms. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
ICESCR Committee) – a group of human rights experts that reviews state party 
reports on implementation of the ICESCR and issues recommendations con-
cerning its interpretation – began to issue “general comments” that clarifi ed and 
expanded economic, social, and cultural rights in novel ways. The committee 
developed a “violations approach” that distinguishes “core obligations” – mini-
mum essential levels of each right that all states parties must immediately imple-
ment – from other aspects of rights that may be achieved progressively (General 
Comment No. 3  1990 ; Chapman  1998 ). The committee also articulated a distinc-
tive tripartite framework of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfi ll. According 
to this framework, obligations to respect require states to refrain from interfering 
with protected rights. Obligations to protect “require states to prevent interference 
by third parties (particularly nonstate actors).” And obligations to fulfi ll “involve 
the duty . . . to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, 
promotional, and other measures aimed at the full realization of the rights in 
 question” (Dennis & Stewart  2004 : 491). 
 Through its general comments and review of state party reports, the ICESCR 
Committee became an international focal point for the normative development of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. The legal frameworks developed by the com-
mittee increased the institutional alignment of the human rights TLO, but they also 
modestly decreased its normative settlement , as states sometimes sparred with the 
committee over how to interpret and apply particular rights. These developments did 
not, however, alter the diverse geographic scope of economic, social, and cultural 
rights. A number of countries – including, most notably, the United States – refrained 
from ratifying the ICESCR and thus remained outside of the committee’s norma-
tive orbit. And even with the committee’s jurisprudential enhancements,  economic, 
social, and cultural rights remained highly resource- and context- dependent, with 
the result that the content of rights varied widely depending on a country’s level of 
economic development . 
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 C.  The Combined Impact of Distinct TLOs for Intellectual Property 
and for Human Rights on Access to Medicines 
 The previous sections describe the evolution of two distinct TLOs, one relating to 
IP and the other relating to human rights. During this period, which lasted until 
the mid-1990s, the international regulation of A2M was minimal and unobtrusive. 
Every state could decide whether or not to ratify the two key  multilateral treaties – 
the Paris Convention and the ICESCR – whose preeminence signaled the high 
degree of institutional alignment within each TLO . Moreover, those states that did 
join could rightfully argue that these treaties did not impose onerous requirements 
regarding either patent protection for new drugs or the human right to health, nor 
did they contain robust international enforcement mechanisms to monitor potential 
violations. 
 As a result of this international regulatory lassitude, each nation enjoyed broad 
discretion to decide which domestic laws and policies best promoted its national 
welfare relating to A2M. Industrialized states that prioritized innovation by domes-
tic pharmaceutical fi rms added process and product patents to their national IP 
 statutes. In contrast, poorer developing countries were free to eschew such protec-
tion and instead adopt policies to increase the availability of cheaper medicines 
manufactured by generic drug companies at home or abroad. 
 Toward the end of this period, however, normative contestations increased in both 
TLOs . Within IP, industrialized and developing countries clashed at WIPO over 
the scope and content of patent protection rules, and the United States threatened 
to impose unilateral trade sanctions to pressure developing countries to  recognize 
and expand the protection of pharmaceutical patents. Within human rights, nations 
that had ratifi ed the ICECSR with the understanding that economic and social 
rights (including the right to health) were ambiguous and aspirational found them-
selves reporting to a committee of UN experts – the ICESCR Committee – which 
had developed a more precise violations approach and a tripartite framework of legal 
obligations. 
 Importantly, these normative contestations occurred exclusively  within each 
TLO; they did not spill over the boundary  between the two TLOs. Stated differently, 
the regulation of A2M was “partitioned” between the two TLOs, with “ different 
subsets of [the] underlying issue” governed by distinct legal norms (Halliday & 
Shaffer,  Chapter 1 : 33) that allowed considerable discretion to national govern-
ments.  Figure 9.1 provides a graphical illustration of this alignment. 
 The absence of  inter -TLO confl icts may seem surprising, given that actors in both 
TLOs claimed the authority to regulate A2M. What explains this lack of engage-
ment? During the second half of the twentieth century, the most pressing concerns 
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in the human rights TLO were the elaboration and codifi cation of legal norms and 
the creation of new international monitoring mechanisms (Helfer  1999 : 296–301). 
In the IP TLO, in contrast, the post-war era’s central focus was the gradual expan-
sion of protected subject matter through multilateral treaty revisions that were then 
transposed to the national and local levels. Both sets of activities focused internally 
on building the core components of each legal order. More importantly, the states 
and non-state actors in each TLO interacted infrequently, if at all, and they did not 
view the other legal order as threatening their own TLO’s sphere of infl uence or its 
opportunities for expansion (Helfer  2007 : 280). 
 III.  Phase 2: The Expansion of the IP TLO Relating 
to Pharmaceutical Patents 
 The isolation between the two legal orders ended in the mid-1990s with a marked 
expansion of the IP TLO, in particular its international rules relating to product 
and process patents for new drugs. This expansion resulted from a deliberate and 
politically astute strategy by industrialized nations and their pharmaceutical indus-
tries to make strong IP protection rules a mandatory component of the world  trading 
system. These actors achieved a major victory in 1994 with the adoption of the 
 TRIPS Agreement, a multilateral IP treaty linked to the newly established WTO, 
whose detailed patent rules are far more demanding than those required by the Paris 
Convention. 
 In addition to raising substantive IP protection standards, this strategy radically 
increased the geographic scope and enforcement mechanisms of the IP TLO . As a 
condition of joining the WTO, every nation – including many developing countries 
that previously had denied patents for new drugs – was required to accept TRIPS 
and to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system . In the years immediately 
following the adoption of TRIPS, industrialized countries and pharmaceutical 
fi rms pushed for even further expansion of the IP TLO, demanding strict domestic 
implementation of IP rights, fi ling WTO complaints against countries that violated 
Intellectual
property
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 Figure 9.1.  Two distinct TLOs for human rights and intellectual property. 
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TRIPS’ patent rules , and negotiating regional and bilateral treaties that required 
pharmaceutical patent protections that exceeded even TRIPS’ demanding  standards 
(Sell  2003 ). 
 This section fi rst identifi es the facilitating circumstances and precipitating 
 conditions that led to a dramatic “regime shift” from the WIPO to the WTO (Helfer 
 2004 ). As a consequence of this shift, the transnational regulation of A2M moved 
from the upper left to the lower right quadrant of  Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer, 
 Chapter 1 ) due to an increase in normative settlement and a decrease in institutional 
alignment. This reconfi guration refl ected the success of industrialized nations in 
imposing their desire for pharmaceutical patent protection on other countries, an 
imposition that narrowed the domestic policy space available to those countries to 
provide inexpensive drugs to consumers. As the  section III.C reveals, however, the 
exercise of this hegemonic power was unstable and ultimately provoked a backlash 
in the human rights TLO over A2M . 
 A.  Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions 
 Two factors motivated the United States and the European Community to shift IP 
rulemaking from the WIPO, where it had been centered for decades, to the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the principal treaty of the world trad-
ing system. The fi rst factor related to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Paris 
Convention negotiations hosted by the WIPO in the mid-1980s. The second focused 
on institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent IP 
protection standards and enforcement mechanisms that these states favored. The 
end of the Cold War, the resulting rise of U.S. hegemony, and the shift to deregu-
lated market-based economies facilitated the success of this endeavor. 
 As described in  Section II , industrialized nations successfully fended off efforts 
by WIPO’s developing country members to weaken international patent rules. The 
acrimonious failure of the Paris Convention diplomatic conference in the mid-1980s 
preserved existing treaty bargains, but it also convinced industrialized countries that 
it would be futile to launch any new initiatives to expand IP protection at WIPO. 
Instead, the United States (later joined by the European Community, Canada, and 
Japan) included IP protection as part of the mandate for the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations in GATT, which ultimately led to the creation of the WTO. 
 Three institutional features of the GATT/WTO made it a superior venue in 
which to negotiate stronger IP protection standards and enforcement mechanisms. 
First, as the nation and the region with the largest domestic markets, the United 
States and the European Community enjoyed far greater leverage in the GATT/
WTO than they did in WIPO. GATT/WTO negotiations also operate on the prin-
ciple of consensus, which the United States and the European Community used 
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strategically to force disclosure of weaker states’ preferences, block proposals those 
states favored, and advance their own initiatives (Braithwaite & Drahos  2000 : 570; 
Steinberg  2002 : 350–367). 
 Second, the ability to link IP to trade expanded the zone of agreement among 
nations with divergent interests. Developing countries voluntarily accepted (or were 
coerced to accept) a grand bargain whose terms included greater access to the mar-
kets of industrialized nations in exchange for incorporating IP protection rules and 
enforcement mechanisms into the global trading system (Petersmann  1996 –1997: 
442; Drahos  2002 : 769–770). 
 Third, GATT dispute settlement was far more effective than the adjudica-
tion mechanisms associated with WIPO conventions, mechanisms that were 
 cumbersome in theory and never used in practice (Cordray  1994 ). More impor-
tantly, the Uruguay Round negotiators agreed to substantially overhaul GATT 
dispute  settlement,  establishing a system of mandatory adjudication that included 
binding ad hoc  panels, a standing Appellate Body, and the threat of retaliatory sanc-
tions to induce compliance by states found to have violated global trade rules . 
 By the spring of 1994, the United States and its industrialized country allies had 
achieved their primary objective – an agreement on “trade-related aspects of intel-
lectual property rights” that incorporated strong IP rules into the world trading sys-
tem. The next section describes the consequences for developing countries of this 
shift from the WIPO to  TRIPS. 
 B.  Increased Normative Settlement and Decreased Institutional Alignment 
 TRIPS effectuated nothing short of a revolution in the IP TLO. It increased substan-
tive IP protection rules in several preexisting conventions negotiated within WIPO 
and incorporated them into a single comprehensive multilateral agreement. These 
standards applied to the entire WTO membership , including developing countries 
that had never joined the Paris Convention or that in practice had a tenuous or 
equivocal commitment to protecting IP in their domestic laws. 
 Of particular importance for A2M, TRIPS required that patents and the exclu-
sive rights that accompany them be made available for inventions in “all fi elds of 
technology” if they are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application” (TRIPS, Article 27.1). The breadth of this language and the treaty’s 
negotiating history reveal that patent rights extended both to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and to the processes for manufacturing those products (Gervais  2003 : 218–219). 
These provisions signifi cantly expanded the patentability of new drugs. As discussed 
in  Section II , Phase 1 of the evolution of the A2M TLO (which lasted until the mid-
1990s) was characterized by a widespread diversity of national practices, with many 
countries eschewing pharmaceutical patent protection on public health grounds. 
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Under TRIPS, however, “so long as an invention meets the technical requirements 
of patentability, a patent must be granted for an inventive product, including a 
 pharmaceutical compound, even if it would negatively impact the accessibility of 
drugs” (Ho  2007 : 1476). 
 In addition to expanding substantive patent rules, TRIPS also increased oppor-
tunities to enforce patent rights at the local, national, and international levels. For 
IP owners, the treaty enhanced domestic enforcement by requiring all WTO mem-
bers to restructure their judicial and administrative systems relating to IP rights. 
For states, TRIPS provided two new international institutions: a TRIPS Council, 
an interstate body that reviews national implementation measures and highlights 
potential areas of non-compliance; and a Dispute Settlement Body with the power 
to adjudicate complaints and penalize treaty violators. Faced with the prospect of 
robust enforcement at all three levels of the IP TLO, WTO members devoted signif-
icant time and resources to implementing the treaty in their national legal systems 
(Helfer  2004 : 23). 
 TRIPS’ negotiators recognized that the overhaul of domestic IP laws and 
enforcement measures would be complicated and time consuming. To ease the 
transition, the treaty provided a period of up to ten years during which develop-
ing and least-developed countries were not required to extend full patent rights 
to  pharmaceutical products (TRIPS, Articles 65, 70; Gervais  2003 : 349, 365–366). 
It also included provisions – such as compulsory licenses, exceptions to exclusive 
rights, and parallel importation rules – that allowed all WTO members a modicum 
of fl exibility to balance pharmaceutical patent protection against other social and 
economic goals. 
 These transition and fl exibility provisions tempered TRIPS’ hard edges. But those 
edges were quickly sharpened again by bilateral and regional trade pacts that the 
United States and the European Community negotiated with developing countries . 
 These treaties are known as “TRIPS Plus” agreements because they contain IP pro-
tection rules that are more stringent than those of TRIPS, compel developing states 
fully to implement TRIPS before its transition periods expire, or require those coun-
tries to join or adhere to other multilateral IP agreements (GRAIN  2001 ). By nego-
tiating treaties with developing nations bilaterally or in small groups, the United 
States and European Community used their greater negotiating leverage to ratchet 
up IP rights and to “push . . . harmonization forward at a pace that is greater than 
is apparently possible within the framework of the WTO” (OECD  2001 : 112). They 
also successfully “integrated the patent offi ces of many developing countries . . . into 
a system of global governance ” that is closely modeled on the patent systems of 
industrialized nations (Drahos  2010 : 318). 
 As the foregoing discussion reveals, the negotiation of TRIPS and TRIPS Plus 
treaties caused a marked expansion of the IP TLO . These developments did not, 
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however, eclipse WIPO as a forum for IP norm development. On the contrary, they 
engendered a “competitive alignment ,” by which “different organizations and actors” 
in the TLO operated “within a common frame but . . . attempt[ed] to predominate 
in providing the relevant legal norms” (Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 : 34). Over 
time, a “division of labor” developed between the two organizations (Ibid.: 17). The 
WTO emphasized IP enforcement and dispute settlement, whereas WIPO focused 
on creating new IP norms, administering existing treaties, and providing technical 
assistance to developing states. This two-track system facilitated further expansion 
of the IP TLO. In the area of patents, for example, the WIPO served as a forum for 
the negotiation of two multilateral agreements – the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) and 
the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) – which extended TRIPS by harmonizing 
patent application procedures and expanding the rights of patent owners . 
 C.  The Impact of Increased Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and IP 
Enforcement Mechanisms on Access to Medicines 
 The developments described in  Section IIIB increased normative settlement 
and the lack of institutional alignment within the IP TLO in three ways: by expand-
ing the protection of pharmaceutical patents, extending that protection to the entire 
WTO membership, and creating multiple venues for negotiating new IP norms. At 
the national and local levels, these events substantially reduced the policy freedom 
that governments had previously enjoyed to regulate A2M. The rejection of product 
and process patents – and the lower prices for the new drugs that accompanied 
them – was no longer possible for any state that wanted to participate in the global 
trade regime. Nor could a state commit to TRIPS in principle and then ignore it 
in practice, because the treaty’s enforcement requirements and dispute settlement 
mechanisms made shirking TRIPS a far more costly strategy. By the century’s end, 
therefore, it appeared that industrialized countries and multinational pharmaceuti-
cal fi rms had triumphed in their campaign to expand mandatory patent protection 
for new drugs.  Figure 9.2 provides a graphical illustration of this phenomenon. 
 Yet contrary to the predictions of some commentators, the expansion of the IP 
TLO did not generate a global settlement consensus in favor of higher IP pro-
tection. Instead, it increased the tensions between the IP TLO and other TLOs, 
including human rights, on whose turf IP rules were now impinging. These ten-
sions had both substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantively, TRIPS and 
TRIPS Plus treaties required the recognition of IP over knowledge goods, including 
life-saving medicines, which in other TLOs were treated (if sometimes only implic-
itly) as beyond private ownership on public health, moral, or cultural grounds. 
Procedurally,  tensions were engendered by IP treaties’ more stringent enforcement 
mechanisms as compared to those of human rights agreements. These enforcement 
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disparities created an imbalance, whereby adherence to the latter agreements could 
be  subordinated to compliance with the former in areas where the two sets of treaties 
overlapped (Helfer  2004 : 26–27). 
 Industrialized countries and IP industries exacerbated the fears of this subordi-
nation by fi ling complaints in the WTO and in national courts that ignored coun-
tervailing health policies in favor of maximalist conceptions of IP protection. The 
result, as  Section IV explains, was a growing belief – shared by many developing 
country governments, civil society groups, activists, and scholars – that TRIPS and 
its progeny were coerced agreements that should be resisted rather than embraced 
(Govaere & Demaret  2001 ; Harris  2006 ). 
 IV.  Phase 3: The Backlash against Pharmaceutical 
Patents and the Increased Legalization and Justiciability 
of the Human Right to Health 
 The backlash against the IP TLO, which began approximately in 2000, has several 
distinct but mutually reinforcing elements. International human rights experts and 
monitoring bodies devoted signifi cant attention to concretizing the  right to health 
and to highlighting the negative consequences of TRIPS for the realization of that 
right. A consortium of public health NGOs and developing countries then invoked 
these norms to launch campaigns against pharmaceutical patent protection at the 
transnational, national, and local levels. These campaigns thwarted high-profi le 
 litigation against Brazil and South Africa that sought to enforce patent rights over 
life-saving antiretroviral medications for HIV/AIDS . In the WTO, A2M proponents 
pushed for a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and an amendment to TRIPS 
that expressly recognized the need to adjust the protection of pharmaceutical pat-
ents in light of public health needs. 
 These campaigns, and the concretization of the human right to health on which 
they were premised, halted the drive to expand IP protection in the WTO and 
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 Figure 9.2.  Patent protection for new drugs and the expansion of the intellectual 
property TLO. 
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WIPO, the key multilateral venues of the IP TLO. They did not, however, expand 
or preserve the policy discretion of governments to regulate A2M. In fact, that discre-
tion decreased as a result of competing strategies adopted by coalitions that favored 
or opposed strong patent rules for new drugs. 
 First, in response to complaints from individuals and public interest NGOs, 
national judges became increasingly bold in adjudicating complaints invoking the 
right to health. Courts in several developing countries ordered health ministries 
to provide patented drugs to patients, sometimes with little regard for their cost or 
their impact on broader health outcomes. Second, industrialized countries, recog-
nizing the inhospitable environment in the WTO and WIPO, shifted to plurilateral 
and bilateral negotiating venues. Capitalizing on their greater negotiating leverage 
in these forums, industrialized states challenged attempts by developing nations to 
invoke the fl exibilities in TRIPS (such as compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical 
patents) and launched new treaty initiatives (such as the  ACTA and TPP ) to reverse 
the effects of the WTO public health declaration adopted earlier in the decade 
(Drezner  2007 : 176–203). 
 As a result of these developments, contestations over the right to health and phar-
maceutical patents now occur in numerous venues at the multilateral, plurilateral, 
regional, domestic, and local levels, placing the A2M TLO in the lower left quadrant 
of  Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ). These contestations have squeezed 
many governments between highly legalized IP protection and right to health rules, 
leaving little policy space for domestic regulations that accommodate both sets of 
rules . 
 A.  Facilitating Circumstances 
 The rapid normative evolution of the right to health has its origins in two key docu-
ments in the human rights TLO: (1) a General Comment on the right to health by 
the ICESCR Committee, and (2) a resolution on IP and human rights by the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. These two 
documents, both adopted in August 2000, triggered a norm cascade (Lutz & Sikkink 
 2001 ) of resolutions, reports, and recommendations in the UN human rights system 
that identifi ed signifi cant confl icts between IP treaties and the right to health and 
extended that right to include access to live-saving medicines. 
 The General Comment is a detailed analysis of the legal obligations that, in the 
view of the ICESCR Committee, are implicit in state parties’ recognition of “the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of . . . health” 
(ICESCR, Article 12). As applied to A2M, this right includes four elements: the 
availability of medication in suffi cient quantity, the physical and economic acces-
sibility of medication without discrimination, the acceptability of medication in 
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light of cultural and ethical norms, and the provision of medication of an appropri-
ate quality (General Comment No. 14  2000 ; see also Hestermeyer  2007 : 105). The 
General Comment also analyzes the tripartite “respect, protect, and ensure” frame-
work described in  Section II . To “respect” the right to health, states parties must 
refrain from denying or interfering with access to essential medicines. To “protect” 
that right, states must prevent third parties, including private actors, from interfering 
with such access. And to “fulfi ll” that right, states are required to adopt appropri-
ate legislative, administrative, and budgetary measures to facilitate access (General 
Comment No. 14  2000 : paras. 33–38). 
 In recognition of the progressive nature of the right to health, the General 
Comment does not require immediate access to all medications. Rather, it identi-
fi es the “core obligation” of states parties as the provision of “essential drugs, as 
from time to time defi ned under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs” 
(Ibid.: para. 43(d)). As part of that program, WHO maintains and updates a Model 
List of medicines that are intended to “address the priority health care requirements 
of a given population.” The most recent version of the list includes more than 350 
drugs for treating infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tubercu-
losis, chronic diseases such as hypertension and diabetes, and reproductive health 
(WHO  2010 ). 
 The UN Sub-Commission’s attention to access to medicines originated in a state-
ment by a consortium of NGOs that forcefully asserted “the primacy of human 
rights obligations over the commercial and profi t-driven motives upon which agree-
ments such as TRIPS are based” (Weissbrodt & Schoff  2003 ). The consortium’s 
views shaped the Sub-Commission’s subsequent resolution on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Human Rights (Resolution 2000/7). The resolution asserted that “actual 
or potential confl icts exist between the implementation of [TRIPS] and the realiza-
tion of economic, social and cultural rights,” including “restrictions on access to 
patented pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of the right to 
health” (Ibid.: Preamble, para. 11). To resolve these confl icts, the Sub-Commission 
urged states, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs to recognize that human 
rights have “primacy . . . over economic policies and agreements” (Ibid.: para. 3). 
 A rapid evolution of the human right to health occurred in the decade following 
the adoption of General Comment No. 14 and Resolution 2000/7. The mounting 
opposition to TRIPS and TRIPS Plus treaties conjoined with other factors – includ-
ing concern over the spread of global pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis, and the growing number of life-saving drugs covered by patents – to 
engender repeated assertions that the right to health encompasses a right of access to 
life-saving medicines and that this right has primacy over IP protection. 
 Statements endorsing one or both of these principles spread quickly across the 
human rights TLO. Among the most noteworthy were: declarations by the UN 
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General Assembly in 2001 and 2006; resolutions of the Commission on Human 
Rights in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005; a 2001 study by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights; several reports of Special Rapporteurs on the right to health; Human 
Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines 
adopted in 2008; a 2001 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property by 
the ICESCR Committee; a 2003 general comment by the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child; and a 2008 resolution of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Helfer & Austin  2011 : 113–114). Supportive commentators ana-
lyzed and extended these statements, bolstering the claim that international law had 
evolved to include a right of access to life-saving medications, regardless of whether 
they were protected by patents (Lazzarini  2003 ; Yamin  2003 ; see also Helfer  2003 ). 
 B.  Precipitating Conditions 
 The A2M norm cascade provided a tool for actors in the human rights TLO to 
 counter the rapid expansion of pharmaceutical patents in the IP TLO. As a formal 
matter, the norms generated by this cascade were non-binding and thus did not con-
fl ict with the legally binding obligations of TRIPS or TRIPS Plus treaties. However, 
as the number and specifi city of the statements endorsing a right of access to 
 life-saving medicines increased, it became progressively more diffi cult for industrial-
ized countries and pharmaceutical fi rms to challenge their legitimacy. Developing 
countries and right to health NGOs also invoked these norms in international and 
national venues to reorient a legal discourse that privileged the private ownership of 
IP over human rights and other social values (Forman  2008 ). At fi rst, proponents of 
greater A2M used the right to health as a shield to oppose litigation against Brazil 
and South Africa that was seeking to enforce pharmaceutical patents for HIV/AIDS 
drugs . But these actors soon switched to an affi rmative strategy, invoking the right as 
a sword to bring about legal change in the WTO . 
 In 2000, the United States , in response to demands from its domestic pharma-
ceutical industry, fi led a WTO complaint against Brazil to challenge a provision 
of that country’s 1996 industrial property law requiring “local working” of foreign 
patents. The law authorized the government to issue compulsory licenses for pat-
ents not manufactured in Brazil within three years of receiving patent protection. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the government used the threat of such licenses to 
negotiate with pharmaceutical fi rms for deep discounts on patented antiretroviral 
drugs, which it then distributed to patients at very low prices. Human rights and 
public health NGOs responded to the WTO suit by publicizing Brazil’s striking 
success in reducing HIV/AIDS deaths. After several months of intense pressure, 
the United States withdrew its complaint again Brazil in June 2001 (Sell  2003 : 137; 
Bird & Cahoy  2008 ). 
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 A second critical juncture in the A2M campaign occurred in  South Africa, a 
country with one of the world’s highest HIV/AIDS infection rates. Between 1997 and 
2001, the United States and pharmaceutical companies threatened trade sanctions 
and litigation in an attempt to block South Africa from enforcing the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, a 1997 statute that authorized the 
parallel importation of patented drugs and created a transparent pricing mechanism 
that included generic medicines (Klug  2008 ; Muriu  2009 ). 
 After the adoption of the Act, a consortium of forty pharmaceutical companies 
fi led a lawsuit in the High Court of Pretoria, arguing that the statute violated TRIPS 
and the right to property protected by South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution. 
The government opposed these claims, but it did not raise human rights or public 
health arguments. That changed in 2001, when the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) – a South African A2M advocacy group – joined the litigation as an amicus 
curiae. In addition to fi ling affi davits that illuminated the legal and factual fl aws in 
the pharmaceutical companies’ claims, TAC invoked the rights to life and health 
protected by the South African Constitution and by treaties that the country had 
ratifi ed, as well as the international soft-law statements cited in Part IVA, which 
endorsed a right of access to life-saving medicines. The NGO argued that these 
rights should be given priority over IP protection and provided the legal authority to 
uphold the Medicines Act (Heywood  2001 ; Muriu  2009 ). 
 The TAC also mobilized outside of the courtroom, collaborating with NGOs and 
activists in other parts of the world to oppose efforts by the United States and the 
pharmaceutical industry to enforce drug patents for HIV/AIDS. Civil society activ-
ism during a U.S. presidential election cycle convinced the Clinton Administration 
in mid-1999 to withdraw the threat of trade sanctions against South Africa (Sell 
2001– 2002 ). The same campaign also induced the pharmaceutical fi rms to drop their 
challenge to the Medicines Act. In April 2001, the drug companies unconditionally 
withdrew their lawsuit in response to what one NGO leader described as “strong inter-
national public outrage over the companies’ legal challenge of a developing country’s 
medicines law and the companies’ weak legal position” (‘t Hoen  2005 : 206). 
 The victories in Brazil and South Africa emboldened access to medicines advo-
cates to push for reforms in the WTO. In the same month as the South African 
litigation ended , a coalition of  fi fty-eight developing countries called on the TRIPS 
Council to hold a special session devoted to public health issues (‘t Hoen  2002 : 38). 
In a document distributed prior to the June 2001 session of the Council, the coalition 
cited resolutions and statements adopted in the UN human rights system to support 
a proposal clarifying that TRIPS does not interfere with national policies that pro-
mote A2M.  This proposal served as the template for the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health, which was adopted at the November 2001 Ministerial Conference 
that launched the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations (Helfer  2004 : 65–66). 
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 Among the declaration’s most noteworthy provisions were affi rmations of WTO 
members’ rights “to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all” and “to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement 
which provide fl exibility for this purpose,” including compulsory licenses issued in 
response to national health emergencies (Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
 2001 : para. 4). The declaration also allowed least-developed countries to defer IP 
protection of pharmaceutical products for an additional ten years, until 2016. And it 
promised to fi nd a mechanism for countries that lacked suffi cient domestic pharma-
ceutical manufacturing capacity to import generic drugs from other WTO countries 
(Abbott  2002 ). In response to the latter provision, the TRIPS Council waived the 
domestic use requirement for compulsory licenses in 2003. In 2005, the Council 
made the waiver permanent, adopting an amendment to TRIPS – to date, the only 
formal revision of that treaty – that will enter into force if and when it is ratifi ed by 
two-thirds of WTO member states (Abbott  2005 ). 
 C.  The Domestic Adjudication of the Right to Health, the Spread 
of Bilateral and Plurilateral IP Treaties, and the Further Diminution 
of Domestic Policy Space 
 Many NGOs and commentators initially hailed the 2001 Public Health Declaration 
as a major breakthrough for A2M and a harbinger of broader efforts to dial back IP 
protection standards (Sell  2001 –2002; Lohr  2002 ). Subsequent assessments were less 
sanguine, however, especially as the legal and practical complexities of the 2003 
waiver and the 2005 amendment became apparent (Abbott & Reichman  2007 ). Yet 
even critics acknowledged that the Public Health Declaration emboldened govern-
ments to invoke the fl exibilities in TRIPS in their domestic laws. 
 There is considerable evidence to support this conclusion. For the fi rst few years 
after TRIPS entered into force in 1995, no state issued compulsory licenses for pat-
ented HIV/AIDS drugs. Beginning in 2002, however, both developing and  middle-
income nations began to issue such licenses, including Brazil (2007), Cameroon 
(2005), Ghana (2005), Indonesia (2004), Malaysia (2004), Mozambique (2004), 
Rwanda (2007), Thailand (2007), Zambia (2004), and Zimbabwe (2002). As a result, 
the price of antiretroviral medications in these countries has fallen sharply (Ho 
 2007 ). 
 Viewed in isolation, this empirical pattern suggests that the 2001 Public Health 
Declaration – and the concretization of the human right to health that inspired 
it – expanded the discretion of governments to regulate A2M. In reality, however, 
the domestic regulatory space has contracted, rather than expanded, over the past 
decade. The reasons are twofold: burgeoning litigation in national courts invoking a 
right of right access to patented medicines and renewed efforts by the United States 
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and the European Community to circumvent the Public Health Declaration by 
negotiating bilateral and plurilateral TRIPS Plus treaties.  Figure 9.3 illustrates the 
diminution of domestic policy discretion . 
 As noted in  Section IIB2 , many commentators in the 1980s and 1990s were highly 
skeptical of the justiciability of the human right to health . Their concerns centered 
on the ambiguous content of the right and the inability of domestic judges to make 
the fi nancial and administrative decisions that litigation of health rights necessarily 
entailed. However, after the detailed exegesis of the right to health by the  ICESCR 
Committee and the numerous statements by UN human rights bodies endorsing a 
right of access to medicines, national courts in developing countries began to tackle 
the challenges of adjudicating these rights in response to complaints by individu-
als and NGOs. The trend was especially pronounced in Latin America , a region 
“ characterized by rights-rich constitutions, high social exclusion, and  systemic 
 failures of representation by the political branches of government” (Yamin & 
 Parra-Vera  2009 : 149). 
 In an early and infl uential case, more than 150 HIV-infected individuals fi led a 
complaint against the Venezuelan Ministry of Health  and Social Action alleging that 
the failure to provide antiretroviral drugs violated multiple rights guaranteed by the 
Venezuelan constitution and by international law. In a landmark decision, the Supreme 
Court of Venezuela ruled for the plaintiffs ( Cruz del Valle Berm ú dez v. Ministerio 
de Sanidad y Asistencia Social  1999 ). The court rejected the defense of insuffi cient 
resources and ordered the health ministry to seek the budget allocations needed to 
provide antiretroviral medications to all HIV-infected individuals in the country. The 
order was both comprehensive and highly specifi c, requiring the ministry to:
 take measures necessary to ensure an uninterrupted supply of antiretroviral • 
drugs; 
 cover all tests necessary for the use of antiretroviral drugs; • 
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 Figure 9.3.  The diminution of domestic policy discretion and the creation of an access 
to medicines TLO. 
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 provide medications necessary for treating opportunistic infections; • 
 develop a policy of comprehensive medical assistance for people living with • 
HIV/AIDS eligible for social assistance; and 
 undertake research on HIV/AIDS to develop programs and infrastructure to • 
prevent HIV transmission and care for those infected. 
In the decade following the  Berm ú dez decision, domestic adjudication of A2M 
claims increased sharply , pushed forward by advocates who relied on the interpreta-
tions of the right to health articulated by the ICESCR Committee and other UN 
human rights bodies. National judges responded favorably to these claims, with high 
courts in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kenya, Peru, and 
South Africa recognizing that HIV/AIDS patients have a right to receive antiretro-
viral medicines (Byrne  2009 ; Yamin & Gloppen  2011 ; O’Neil Institute  2013 ). A 2006 
study identifi ed seventy-one cases from twelve countries invoking a right of access to 
medicines, with a success rate of 83 percent (Hogerzeil et al.  2006 ). 
 Litigation before regional human rights bodies has reinforced this trend. In 2001, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared admissible a com-
plaint challenging El Salvador’s failure to provide antiretroviral drugs to HIV/AIDS 
patients. The government quickly settled the case after a Salvadorian court ruled in 
the plaintiffs’ favor, a decision that “contributed to treatment activism throughout 
the region, complementing high-profi le cases before a number of domestic courts” 
(UNAIDS  2006 : 71). In 2008, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights adopted a Resolution on Access to Health and Needed Medicines in Africa 
that closely tracks the tripartite framework of the ICESCR Committee. 
 Yet even as a growing number of national courts were enforcing a right of A2M , 
the United States and the European Community were stepping up efforts to tighten 
IP rules for pharmaceutical patents in regional, plurilateral, and bilateral trade agree-
ments. Many of these treaties undercut the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
by adopting provisions to restrict the very same fl exibility mechanisms that the declara-
tion had previously reaffi rmed (‘t Hoen  2009 : 70–71, 74–75), including the following:
 • Patent linkage . Prohibits public health authorities from granting approval to 
market lower-cost generic drugs during the patent term without the consent of 
the patent holder; 
 • Data exclusivity . Prohibits the use of pharmaceutical test data for regulatory 
purposes, delaying the approval of generic medicines; 
 • Patent extension . Lengthens the term of pharmaceutical patent protections 
beyond the twenty years required by TRIPS to offset regulatory delays in 
approving new drugs; 
 • Second use patents . Requires the recognition of pharmaceutical patents for new 
uses of existing chemical substances; 
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 • Compulsory license restrictions . Limits the grounds for authorizing local drug 
companies to manufacture and distribute generic medicines, provided that 
they pay reasonable royalties to patent owners; 
 • Prohibitions of parallel importation . Prevents the importation of generic medi-
cines manufactured in other countries. 
 In addition to negotiating treaties that enhanced the protection of pharmaceutical 
patents , the United States and the European Community also launched plurilateral 
treaty initiatives to augment the criminal and civil enforcement of IP rights. Among 
the most notorious of these initiatives is ACTA , whose signatories include Australia , 
Canada , Japan , Mexico , Morocco, New Zealand , Singapore, South Korea , and 
Switzerland. According to EC offi cials, ACTA seeks nothing less than “to create 
a new global gold standard on IPR enforcement” (European Commission  2007 ). 
The treaty has engendered strong opposition from civil society groups not only 
because its enforcement rules exceed those in TRIPS but also because its draft texts 
were kept secret until the agreement was all but fi nalized in late 2010 (Geist  2010 ). 
 ACTA applies to all types of  IP, but A2M advocates are especially concerned that 
the treaty will hamper trade in pharmaceuticals by enabling patent owners to seize 
generic drugs in transit between countries that are not parties to the treaty (Grosse 
Ruse-Khan  2011 ; Yu  2012 ). 
 These developments have had two consequences in the A2M TLO. The fi rst, 
which relates to the TLO’s formal legal rules, has been to constrict the autonomy of 
national governments to decide how best to meet the health needs of their popula-
tions. On the one hand, the expansion of pharmaceutical patents has sharply lim-
ited opportunities to import, approve, manufacture, and distribute generic drugs 
to the patients who need them. On the other hand, domestic courts have invoked 
right to health clauses in national constitutions and human rights treaties to compel 
governments to provide such medicines, in some instances without regard to cost. 
A few commentators have called for a further diminution of government discretion, 
arguing that “states must use TRIPS fl exibilities to fulfi ll their duties under the right 
to health, and that they must negotiate less restrictive intellectual property rights in 
bilateral free-trade agreements” (Forman  2007 : 345). 
 A second consequence relates to law in action versus law on the books. The infl u-
ence of formal legal rules is often dependent on their application in practice by key 
actors. In the IP system, the front-line decision makers include offi cials in domes-
tic IP administrative agencies who review patent applications from pharmaceuti-
cal companies. Studies of these agencies in India and Central and South America 
reveal that agency offi cials have considerable latitude to apply national IP laws in 
ways that limit the number of pharmaceutical patents granted in a given jurisdiction 
(Helfer et al.  2009 ; Kapczynski  2009 ; Dreyfuss & Rodr í guez-Garavito  2014 ;). Over 
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the past few years, however, developing countries have come under pressure from 
industrialized nations to reduce or eliminate the discretion of agency offi cials. The 
patent linkage and data exclusivity rules discussed earlier in this section are the most 
common manifestations of this trend. Another recent example concerns the con-
troversies relating to the power of Brazil ’s National Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA) to review drug patents granted by the National Institute of Industrial 
Property (INPI), the Brazilian administrative body responsible for patent examina-
tions and registrations (Center for Strategic Studies and Debates  2013 : ch. 8). 
 V.  Conclusion 
 By charting the evolution of IP and human rights rules governing access to medi-
cines, this chapter makes three contributions to the study of TLOs. First, the chapter 
questions the conventional wisdom that the A2M issue area is characterized by high 
legalization of IP protection (obligatory and precise rules governing pharmaceutical 
patents with strong adjudication and enforcement mechanisms) and low legalization 
of the human right to health (hortatory and vague norms with few opportunities for 
adjudication or enforcement). The chapter further demonstrates that the legalization 
of the right to health in general and A2M in particular has increased sharply over the 
past decade, primarily in reaction to a previous period of rapid expansion of pharma-
ceutical patent protection rules. The result is a TLO characterized by ongoing high-
profi le clashes over competing legal rules in a broad and diverse array of venues. 
 Second, the chapter analyzes the mechanisms and strategies used by different 
groups of countries and coalitions of non-state actors to develop competing legal 
norms relating to the intersection of the human rights and IP TLOs. These include: 
(1) expanding the number of multilateral, regional, plurilateral, and bilateral venues 
in which treaties and soft-law norms are adopted; (2) opportunistically shifting nego-
tiations among these venues; and (3) regulating how different countries implement 
international rules in their domestic legal orders. 
 These mechanisms and strategies highlight several insights of the TLO frame-
work. First, they show that studies of normative settlement and institutional align-
ment are incomplete unless they consider interactions at the transnational, national, 
and local levels (Halliday & Shaffer,  Chapter 1 ). Second, they suggest that scholars 
must pay careful attention to “defi ning the boundaries of TLOs and changes in their 
boundaries over time” (Ibid.: 20). And third, they demonstrate that the formation of 
a new TLO in response to competitive interactions between two formerly discrete 
TLOs can engender rapid unsettlement and a misalignment of norms and institu-
tions that had been stable and uncontested for an extended period of time (Ibid.). 
 Third, this chapter highlights that the diachronic processes of normative contesta-
tion between and within TLOs can engender negative consequences – in particular, 
Pharmaceutical Patents and the Right to Health TLOs 335
by reducing the policy discretion of governments as norms that are ambiguous and 
limited in scope become more precise, expansive, and enforceable. Other schol-
ars have argued that the “strategic inconsistency” of international rules within 
“regime complexes ” increases discretion by allowing national governments to pick 
and choose which international rules to follow (Raustiala & Victor  2004 : 301–305). 
This chapter suggests a contrary conclusion that future studies of TLOs may wish to 
explore: that highly contested international rules constrain, rather than expand, the 
policy space available to governments when those rules are transposed into national 
and sub-national legal systems and can be invoked and enforced by competing 
groups of domestic actors. 
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